Burma:An army out of control
Despite the Burmese military’s command over the new political system, high numbers of troop desertions suggest all is not going according to the regime’s plan
Before easing into a cross-legged squat on the wood floor, Maung whispers an apology for what he says are “the terrible things” he did while serving as a foot-soldier for the Burmese army. The room is empty. No chairs, tables, fan or bric-a-brac to offer clues to who might have lived there. Smoked cheroot butts dot the dusty floor, their pungent smell now just a stale memory. A sudden gust of wind clatters against loosely bolted wooden shutters. Maung, 19, does not react to the noise.
SOLDIER OF CONSCIENCE: ‘Maung’, whose image is obscured to protect his identity, one of the Burmese army deserters who spoke to ‘Spectrum’ about the atrocities committed by the Burmese army against Karen civillians.
Despite his youth, Maung looks weary. His nose is fight thickened and has a slight twist of broken cartilage. Rough, thick scars track his legs and hands.
Physical damage to Maung’s body is easy to spot, but as he begins to talk, the conflict, confusion and hatred he feels towards his former officers simmers to the surface. Maung’s held-back tears and broken voice are testimony to his hurt as he tries to find words and emotions to cope with the killing, burning and looting of Karen villages he admits his unit carried out.
Maung is one of the many Burmese army deserters, both rank-and-file and commissioned officers, some as high as major, who recently escaped the hardships of the front line for the relative safety of the Thai-Burmese border. Maung, like the other soldiers interviewed for this story, appears frozen, unable to find relief or a way to emotionally cope with the violence inflicted by the Burmese army on Karen civilians.
THE ARMY IS MORALLY BANKRUPT
Regional security experts explain that the latest surge in desertions is a sign of much deeper problems plaguing the Burmese army and is not a direct result of recent heavy fighting with the Karen.
Samuel Blythe, a regional political and defence analyst who writes for Jane’s Defence Weekly, says he has seen confidential internal Burmese army documents that indicate annual desertion rates are between five to 10% of total staffing.
“General Shwe Mann, at the time the government’s third highest-ranking military official, and now the speaker of the lower house, reported that in a four-month period in 2006, manpower losses were as high as 9,497.” Mr Blythe added that this was an increase of 8% on the previous year.
Dr Aung Myoe in his 2009 book on the Burmese army, Building the Tatmadaw, noted that as well as its high desertion rates, estimates were that as many as “13,700 Burmese army soldiers were HIV positive and another 2,000 plus were hepatitis B positive”.
Dr Aung Myoe highlighted discipline as a serious problem and reported that “leaked documents indicated that officers are self-centred and involved in profit-making, and have problems with alcohol and womanising”.
Aarmy’s problem of low morale among its soldiers is related to how its ”troops operate in a very rough operational environment where there is no guarantee of resupply of rations and ammunition or medical evacuation”.
Mr Blythe says the high rates of desertion from the Burmese army can be attributed to a number of factors.
”Front lines are dangerous, the pay’s low and soldiers don’t always get paid. Rations are of poor quality and never arrive on time. Soldiers are scared and the Karen are ruthlessly effective at killing officers and ambushing them.”
Battlefield data collected by the Karen National Union confirm this. In 2010, there were 687 clashes and 413 ambushes in Karen State that killed 665 Burmese soldiers and wounded another 1,391.
Mr Blythe says Burma’s military regime is ideologically and morally bankrupt, and does not have a just cause for its actions.
”Soldiers know they are not fighting for anything worthwhile, if you are going to sacrifice your life you want to believe you’re dying for a noble and worthy cause.”
A relief team leader from the humanitarian organisation Free Burma Rangers who has just returned from a four-month mission deep inside Karen State, estimates the Burmese army strength is about 20% lower than it was in 2008.
”The number of units is less, the number of soldiers is also less. At the height of the offensive in 2007, the Burmese army had 90 battalions in one of our areas, now there are fewer than 60,” he said. ”In 2004, one division averaged about 300 to 400 men, now it’s around 120 to 150. In 2007, army trucks on the roads were a constant _ I counted about 70 trucks in one day. This year on the same road I saw no trucks. The roads are in a terrible state of disrepair. The resupply of rations to front line troops was due in December, 2010, but nothing had arrived by February, 2011.”
DESOLATION ROAD: A threadbare battalion of Burmese soldiers on patrol with a young recruit leading the way. An analyst for ‘Jane’s Defence Weekly’ puts desertion rates in the Burmese army as high as 10%.
THE SOLDIERS’ TALE
Maung explains he was press-ganged into joining the Burmese army at 18. He says it happened when he left his place of work to take money to a sick sister.
”She was in hospital, my father asked me to go there with money. I left work in a hurry to catch the train. Police arrested me for not having my ID card on me. They refused to call my boss and took me to a police station and fingerprinted me. Afterwards the policeman offered to take me to a tea shop.”
Maung says another policeman and a soldier were already waiting at the tea shop.
”They offered me alcohol. I was stressed because I couldn’t help my sick sister. I got drunk. They told me I was now a soldier.”
Maung’s experience is not unique. Former Burmese officers interviewed for this story estimated as many as 90% of new recruits are ”persuaded” to join the army.
”They trick poor kids with promises of money and people accused of petty traffic infringements or minor criminal offences,” one said.
Maung says he was given a medical and sent to training school with 250 other recruits for four months.
”We were told we would get 37,000 kyat [1,120 bahtUS$37] a month during the training and after we finished it would rise to 43,000.”
BULLDOZING DISSENT: The Burmese army on Baw Galigyi Road east of Toungoo in Dec 2010.
Maung and other interviewed deserters accuse their officers of stealing their salaries.
”I only got 2,000 kyat a month. I don’t know where the rest went. Officers told us it was in the ‘soldiers’ bank’, but we didn’t even have bank books.”
Maung says there were 250 other recruits in his intake and they were trained how to march, use guns, explosives and landmines.
”We could make mines. We were shown how to use them so villagers would not spot them on the paths and roads used by Karen soldiers. About 15 of the trainees were young, only about 15 years old. The officers told them to say they were 18.”
Maung was told that he was now fighting to protect his country against the nga pwey (ringworm) _ a derogatory term used by the Burmese army to refer to Karen people.
”The training officers promised to care for me and my family, I believed in them, but they lied. Now I want to eat them raw. I hate them. I want to kill them.”
Maung becomes animated, ignoring questions about the details that would help explain his daily life as a soldier, and instead offers up a grim confession of what drives his hate. His rough hands draw word pictures as he describes how he took part in attacks on villages, was witness to torture of enemy and friend alike, and rape and murder.
”I was close to an older sergeant, he was like family to me. We planned to escape together, he went first. After three days he was captured. They put a rope on his neck and dragged him like a dog. They used a sharp knife to skin his arm. He screamed when they put salt on the raw wound. Everyone was ordered to hurt him. He was stripped and acid thrown on his body.”
Maung’s voice rasps as he explains how soldiers were ordered to put his friend, the sergeant, in what Maung describes as the myay myo (death-hole, being buried alive). Maung says the sergeant was buried up to his neck in the myay myo and was unable to move his arms or knees to help ease his pain from the acid burns.
EXIT STRATEGY: Burmese army deserters, such as the former soldier pictured, say that most recruits are coerced into joining.
”He was screaming for someone to kill him. He begged me to do it. I said I would. First he made me promise to take revenge for him. I took my knife and cut his throat. I held him. I was covered and soaked with my friend’s blood. I loved him very much. The others came, I told them he’s dead. I felt crazy. I tried to hug him. I was hurting, angry. I cut my hand. The officers tried to restrain me.”
When asked if he was scared on the front line, Maung says the sergeant in charge would give them pills or alcohol.
”The pills and the drink made us feel brave, we were not scared of anything or anybody. We went into villages, gathered the people; if they ran we’d shoot. In one village I liked a Karen nurse, but the sergeant arrested her and said he would only let her go if I burned the village and took three guns from the nga pwey. I said this was not possible.”
Maung says the sergeant settled for the burning of seven Karen houses before he released the girl. He and other deserters insisted it was sergeants and officers who raped. ”I saw many women taken by officers. After they used the girls, they sometimes passed them down to the lower ranks. Afterwards the girls are killed.”
Maung uses an incident he was involved in to make his point.
”There were three of us, a captain and two soldiers, on our way to a village. We met two young girls, 15 and 16. The captain grabbed at the girls. I told him to leave them alone. I said ‘If you want it, you can do my arse.’ I asked him if he had daughters. He told me to ‘Shut up and stay still like a robot.’ He said he could do as he wanted as he was the officer.”
Maung says the officer struck him and he hit back with a piece of wood. The other soldier went further and shot and wounded the officer, Captain Thet Aung Phyo.
”My friend was jailed for 13 years; we were not allowed to accuse the officer of rape. I was instructed that there are three rules I had to follow without question: Accept what I was given, do what I was ordered and not to talk back.”
Maung says his only happy day was when he escaped from the front line, and says he has since spent his two months out of uniform and on the run reflecting on what his time in the Burmese army meant.
ON THE MARCH: Burmese army forces, below. Former Burmese army soldiers say that human rights agencies are not exaggerating the extent of the abuses the forces commit against civilians.
AN OFFICER’S STORY
Zaw Tin was a Burmese army officer for more than 13 years until he recently defected. He is urbane and university educated. He says front-line soldiers are usually drunk, bored, scared and believe in the army’s propaganda.
”It makes them want to kill. The Burmese army’s reputation is true, they are as bad as human rights groups claim _ atrocities happen all the time.
”Officers have control in their local area of command; this gives them great power over villagers. They can do whatever they want and they know there will never be any repercussions for their actions.”
Zaw Tin says young officers start out with the dream of becoming senior and respected officers, heroes of the people, before the reality of army life kicks in.
”We try hard to please our leaders. But the pay is poor. A captain gets US$130 [3,900 baht] a month. That’s not enough to raise a family. Money has to be found for our promotions. It’s easy to be corrupt. Every village, every villager is a source of revenue.”
Zaw Tin explains why some border regions are sought-after postings.
”Nobody wants to go to Karen State, but everyone wants to go to the other borders. They are lucrative and not as dangerous. Tax gates are good to raise money _ officers control them. People smuggling, teak, gems, jade, cars _ legal goods as well as contraband are all profitable. Many senior officers are partners with Burmese and foreign business people. The money is shared with the generals getting the largest share. The regime pretends it doesn’t know, but it’s common practice.”
I expected Zaw Tin as an officer to deny Maung’s claims of army brutality towards its own soldiers and the ordered attacks on civilian villages.
”The ‘death hole’ is real, as is the pheyet-lay-phyet [four cuts] army policy in Karen State. The state is divided into different coloured zones _ white, brown and black. Anyone caught in the black zone is the enemy. Soldiers are ordered to shoot, torture, burn and loot. There will be no problems for them [soldiers] if they do _ they can do what they want. Villagers are terrified of soldiers.”
Zaw Tin says Burmese people lost respect for the army after the crackdowns against civilians in 1988, 1990 and 2007.
”Knowing people hate us affects our spirit and morale. Burmese people love their country, but not their army. Most middle-ranked officers are dissatisfied with the army. It is expensive to continue our training. To get from captain to major costs about 1.5 million kyat, from lieutenant colonel to full colonel, 10 million kyat. That’s a lot of money when a captain only earns 130,000 kyat and a colonel 200,000 kyat.”
Zaw Tin, like other defectors interviewed, agreed that seeing child soldiers in the Burmese army is not unusual. ”When I was at Joephyu military training school I saw at least 200 children. Some were as young as nine and most no older than 15 _ even the guns were taller than some of them. Many were street kids, homeless orphans. After training they were to be sent to the front line, some as officers’ aides to carry water, clean, wash clothes and organise food.”
Maung Aye had been a Burmese army officer for 25 years, 10 as a trainer, before defecting, and he agrees with Zaw Tin’s description of army life.
”We indoctrinate our soldiers. We give them a rational reason to hate the ethnic people. They are told they’re fighting to stop the country from disintegrating. We instil in them fear and hatred.
”The fees officers have to pay to gain promotion are high, it encourages corruption, to find outside money. Smuggling cars, petrol, trafficking people, women, drugs are common. Soldiers at the front line doing the fighting get nothing. General Maung Aye and General Than Shwe know exactly what’s happening to civilians on the borders, it’s their orders and it’s their plan. They have what they want _ divided armed ethnic groups and a civilian government controlled by the military.”
On Thursday, the New York-based Human Rights Watch (HRW) sent an open letter to Burma’s judge advocate, Maj Gen Yar Pyae. The letter’s intent was to address a number of human rights abuses and violations by the Burmese army against civilians and was delivered to coincide with Burma’s 66th Armed Forces Day today. The letter urges the ”government and armed forces to respect international humanitarian law (the laws of war) and the international human rights law in the country’s ongoing internal armed conflict”.
The HRW letter highlights Burma’s responsibilities ”under international law to prosecute war crimes”.
HRW’s senior researcher on Burma, David Mathieson, says the Burmese army behaves like a feudal overlord with no respect for any of the international laws it constantly violates.
”They’re trying to build a 21st century army with an 18th-century mentality. If they treat their own soldiers in this barbaric manner, it’s no surprise what they are doing to ethnic villagers. It’s a pyramid scheme of oppression [in] the interest of a small elite who use national interests to maintain their power and increase their individual and corporate wealth.”
