Drugs – Junta’s short and straight road to Obama (Part II)
by admin — last modified 2009-02-27 10:30
By SHAN
27 February 2009
Soon after Part I came out on 23 February, I a journalist friend had argued over it:
The SPDC must also know fully well it can’t afford to buck against Beijing that wants no war on its doorstep
There is no way the Wa will surrender
To which I had fully agreed. For one thing, a clash took place on 3 February in Hopang township where 2 on the Wa side and 8-10 on the Burma side were reportedly killed. Yet both had chosen to downplay the whole incident despite both being in a state of high readiness.
For another, the Wa have often reiterated that the only way they could be disarmed is over their dead bodies. There are several statements made by the Wa which one certainly has the right to feel doubtful about. For instance, that they have totally done away with drugs. However, when it comes to their refusal either to disarm or become subordinate to the Burma Army, it is really hard to harbor any doubts about that.
At least to a certain extent.
Many believe that while the majority may resist any attempt by the Burma Army to the death, the minority led by Wei Xuegang, a drug fugitive from Thailand, who has made large-scale investments in Burma, will hold out for long.
Given a chance, that he will not be prosecuted or extradited to Thailand or even the United States, the same deal offered to the late Khun Sa in 1996, he may well conclude a separate pact with the junta.
With him and his company gone over to the enemy’s camp, the Wa’s financial foothold will be left in dire straits. After all, it was Wei who had saved the Wa from total collapse in 1989 after it had mutinied against the then Beijing-backed Communist Party of Burma.
That itself can be claimed as a crushing victory in the War on Drugs by the junta.
To achieve this, Naypyitaw may possibly not even need to fight. Its experiences with Khun Sa says it needs only a prolonged siege which will eventually break the will of some significant faction in the leadership.
When that happens, the remainder (it hopes) will weaken and perish.
It nevertheless is still a big gamble and what’s more, a big bluff. The generals cannot afford to offend Beijing but it still wants to satisfy Washington and it still hopes a significant part of the Wa forces will realize the errors of their way and come over.
Of course, as opinions go, I can afford to be wrong and I hope I’m wrong. The only problem is that if I’m right, the opposition may as well give up their fight.
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